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                                             CHAPTER SEVEN 
FROM HIROSHIMA TO BAGHDAD:  
MILITARY HEGEMONY  
VERSUS JUST MILITARY PREPAREDNESS 
HARRY VAN DER LINDEN 
 
The political and military leadership of the United States is committed 
to sustaining its position of global military supremacy. This commitment is 
visible in the fact that the current U.S. military budget is around $700 
billion per year and roughly equals the total military expenditure of all 
other countries (Hellman and Sharp 2008), allowing for the continuous 
and unparalleled development of new warfare technologies. It is also 
reflected in the fact that the United States maintains a network of 
significant military bases in dozens of countries across the world, served 
by a highly trained professional military force (Johnson 2004 and 2006). 
America’s naval fleet adds to its global power projection and its capability 
to use at short notice overwhelming lethal force across the world. In this 
essay, I will refer to this position of the United States as supreme 
conventional military power as a position of “military hegemony.” The 
current response of governments across the world to this military 
hegemony ranges from consent to strong opposition with most resistance 
to be found among citizens in many nations (Lutz 2009).  
My main purpose here is to morally question U.S. military hegemony 
in terms of what constitute the legitimate use of military force and the 
proper preparation for using such force. I will first discuss in a somewhat 
synoptic fashion how American hegemonic military force (from its very 
beginning) has been justified in dishonest ways and wrongly executed. 
Next, I will show that Just War Theory (JWT) needs to be revised in order 
to come to a convincing assessment of U.S. military hegemony and its use 
of military force. This will lead me to propose “just military 
preparedness,” consisting of five principles of just military preparedness, 
as a new category of JWT. The failure of the United States to satisfy the 
 
 
 
principles puts into question its very capability of justly resorting to 
military force, of lawfully executing force, and of establishing a just peace 
after war. The principles also point to a more humane alternative of how 
the United States could meet security threats and sustain a peaceful 
international order.  
The Immorality of U.S. Military Hegemony:  
From Hiroshima to Baghdad 
We may see the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 
6, 1945, as the first hegemonic military act of the political and military 
leadership of the United States. The horrific act showed to the world that 
the United States had reached global military dominance, while its very 
execution was at least in part motivated by the idea of sustaining this 
position in the long run. After all, the annihilation of Hiroshima, followed 
three days later by the nuclear destruction of Nagasaki, was not merely 
intended by the United States to force Japan to surrender with the fewest 
number of American casualties (as the official rationale would have it), but 
also had the purpose of intimidating the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
American political leaders had second thoughts about their earlier plea that 
the Soviet Union should enter the war in the Pacific after the defeat of the 
Nazis, and the nuclear attacks on Japan were partly meant to cut short or 
prevent Russian involvement.1
The most recent global display of American military hegemony was 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, especially in its initial 
massive bombing campaign, proudly billed by Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld as a “Shock and Awe” campaign. There are some instructive 
similarities and differences between the bombings of Hiroshima/Nagasaki 
and Baghdad as acts of U.S. military hegemony. In both cases, the direct 
aims were to force surrender through the use of highly concentrated 
overwhelming military force; to limit American casualties; and to display 
superior American warfare technologies, gratifying American tax payers 
that the huge military investments made had a purpose and sending a 
message to those who might think of challenging U.S. military hegemony. 
Indeed, Harlan Ullman and James Wade, Jr., the American strategists who 
articulated in the mid 1990s the strategy of achieving “Rapid Dominance” 
 The beginning of the Cold War, then, was 
an unimaginable inferno, and, within a month after its occurrence, 
American strategists had already made an estimate that 240 nuclear bombs 
would suffice to annihilate all major Russian cities (Walker 2005, 315). 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s meant the end of any real 
challenge to the global military dominance of the United States.  
 through “Shock and Awe,” explicitly linked “Shock and Awe” with the 
nuclear attacks against Japan. They wrote:  
Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe [that] Rapid Dominance 
seeks to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the 
impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had 
on the Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until 
nuclear bombs were used. The impact of those weapons was sufficient to 
transform both the mindset of the average Japanese citizen and the outlook 
of the leadership through this condition of Shock and Awe. The Japanese 
simply could not comprehend the destructive power carried by a single 
airplane. The incomprehension produced a state of awe (1996, 15-16).  
Ullman and Wade further argued that with current warfare technologies, 
notably, cruise missiles and precision guided bombing, “Shock and Awe” 
could be created by totally and rapidly undermining the fighting 
capabilities of the enemy and disrupting civilian life through the 
destruction of key infrastructure facilities. Unlike the Japanese case, then, 
this would enable the achievement of “Rapid Dominance” through “Shock 
and Awe” with limited civilian casualties. In fact, the bombing of Baghdad 
resulted in much fewer casualties than the bombing of either Hiroshima or 
Nagasaki. Ullman and Wade (1996, 50-51, 63) anticipated another 
difference between the two cases by extending the Rapid Dominance 
strategy beyond “war as a response to aggression” to preventive wars 
aimed at meeting future WMD threats. This difference, however, must be 
qualified. For even though the Bush administration presented the war 
against Iraq primarily as a preventive war, it also deceptively linked 
Saddam Hussein to al-Qaeda and made 9/11into casus belli.  
In the months leading up to the Iraqi war, Ullman reiterated in a CBS 
Evening News report that a massive use of U.S. precision weapons could 
create “Shock and Awe” in the vein of the nuclear bombing impact on 
Hiroshima and could lead to a quick victory—he boasts that “2, 3, 4, 5 
days” might suffice2—and, clearly, the Bush administration, at least, 
viewed Operation Iraqi Freedom as a corroboration of “Rapid Dominance” 
through “Shock and Awe.”3 Accordingly, on the assumption that the 
strategy had helped to create an Iraqi mindset open to American aims (and 
also counting on the widespread hatred of Saddam Hussein), the Bush 
administration thought that it could withdraw most troops soon after the 
fall of Baghdad and leave behind only some forces as part of an extended 
empire of bases. The delusion of Rapid Dominance left the United States 
completely unprepared for the emergence of the insurgency.  
 
 
 
The whole scenario that an enemy first viewed as bereft of reason can 
be changed into a willing partner through the eruption of superior 
American military force is contestable—conceptually, morally, and in 
terms of historical accuracy. Still, it may seem that the more discriminate 
attack on Baghdad as compared to the indiscriminate killing at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki shows that U.S. hegemonic military force has become less 
immoral. It may also seem that the United States has made a step forward 
in its moral thinking about how to use military force. A closer look at the 
facts, however, shows that these claims need significant qualification. To 
begin, the very notion that the United States should repeat Hiroshima with 
“a difference” is morally callous, and the very fact that Ullman states this 
so publicly reflects that America has never fully publicly examined the 
extent of its nuclear moral crime. More importantly, even this “difference” 
is tentative. Ullman and Wade, in accordance with official U.S. policy, do 
not wish to exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons in case that 
precision weapons fall short of their aim. They write: “In most or many 
cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing the full 
destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced conventional 
technologies but must be underwritten by the ability to do so” (Ullman and 
Wade 1996, 16).  
Moreover, any claim of moral progress must be tempered in light of 
the fact that the nuclear bombing of Japan came after a long war with high 
American military casualties as well as Japanese atrocities against 
American soldiers that led to an increased American moral numbing and 
moral sliding. Threats to now use nuclear weapons or in other ways inflict 
massive civilian casualties lack similar conditions of diminished 
culpability. At present, we also know better the gruesome results of 
nuclear weapons, and the modern media make it harder to be fooled (or to 
deceive ourselves) by such false beliefs as expressed by President Truman 
in his first announcements of the dropping of the first atomic bomb that it 
was on “Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base,” and that “we 
wished … to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.”4
Perhaps most sobering is that too many Americans in the past twenty 
years have tolerated their government’s involvement in at least hundreds 
of thousands—and, presumably, as many as over one million—civilian 
deaths in Iraq, apparently blind to, or in denial of, American culpability. In 
the 1990s, the deaths resulted from the massive bombing of the 
infrastructure of Iraq during the Gulf War as well as from the after-effects 
of the use of cluster munitions and depleted uranium weapons. But, above 
all, civilian deaths were caused by the very poor health conditions that 
were first created by the destruction of the infrastructure during the Gulf 
  
 War and then kept from improving significantly due to the economic 
sanctions enforced under American leadership.5 The second Iraq war 
caused civilian deaths in similar ways, but the greatest number of civilian 
deaths has resulted from the widespread violence that soon erupted on all 
sides in occupied Iraq.6
A common defense within the United States of its military hegemony 
is that it serves the progress of humanity. In the Introduction to the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, George W. Bush states: 
  
Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength 
and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage 
and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. 
We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: 
conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves 
the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.  
Here President Bush appeals to the idea deeply entrenched in American 
political culture that America uses its military force only toward the good 
of humanity (rather than, say, to secure oil or other resources for the 
nation, maintain its economic dominance, and extend its global political 
influence). And he links this idea to another currently widely accepted idea 
within the political establishment that the United States must use its 
military superiority to play “global cop,” safeguarding the world, 
including the United States itself, from the enemies of freedom and 
democracy. In fact, what makes the expression of these ideas in the NSS 
only noteworthy is that it sets the stage for the doctrine defended in the 
NSS that the United States can and should be entrusted with the right to 
use preventive force against terrorists and states with WMD ambitions.  
The historical record shows that American resort to force is often 
motivated by economic interests and power politics rather than a real 
concern for freedom and democracy abroad. But this does not invalidate 
the somewhat more plausible view that America in the long run seeks to 
promote these ideals for defeated countries. Again, the historical record is 
at best mixed in this regard, but even if we were to assume that U.S. 
military force is intended to be used for spreading democracy and freedom 
in the long term, the right of the United States to impose its own political 
ideals by military intervention needs to be questioned. It is generally 
acknowledged by scholars of international law and ethics that the 
promotion of these ideals does not warrant unilateral resort to military 
force.7 A war seeking to promote freedom and democracy as such is, in the 
final instance, no less an act of aggression than a war motivated by 
“unilateral advantage” alone.  
 
 
 
 Countries in the South may rightfully refuse these political ideals, 
even when these ideals are not advanced through military violence. These 
countries may have good reasons to question their desirability in the first 
place because the freedom and democracy promoted by the United States 
involve a model of economic development that is contestable. There is 
also the misguided understanding of the promoters of the ideals that the 
countries should submit to American political and economic dominance. 
Furthermore, the Bush doctrine of preventive war rightfully has been 
widely criticized. There is no need to repeat here all the objections that 
have been raised against this doctrine, but I will later argue for the broader 
point that maintaining international peace and stability must be seen as a 
collective task, not as the unilateral task of the military hegemon as 
“global cop.”8
The argument that the United States by playing “global cop” protects 
the freedom and safety of its own citizens ignores that U.S. military 
hegemony has a variety of global security costs that leave American 
citizens less safe and free in the long run. Some of the global security costs 
are acknowledged in official policy documents, but their analysis seldom 
reaches the level of public debate. A first cost is nuclear proliferation. The 
overwhelming military superiority of the United States and its frequent use 
of this superiority against countries in the South bring these countries, 
especially in the post-Cold War era, to the conclusion that nuclear 
weapons are the only effective deterrent against U.S. acts of aggression.  
  
Another global security cost is the spread of asymmetric warfare, 
including terrorism. Here the worry is less that states will engage in this 
type of warfare once they are attacked or occupied by the United States; 
rather, the more serious problem is that states in fear of U.S. hegemonic 
aggression will lend tacit support to insurgents and terrorists fighting the 
U.S. elsewhere in the anticipation that this will weaken the threat of the 
military giant.  
A final security cost is a decline of general compliance to international 
law and norms. The United States in its function as “global cop,” as well 
as in its endeavor to sustain its military hegemony, often ignores 
international law and global public opinion, setting a poor model for other 
countries, thus undermining the rule of law. Some examples are that the 
United States has routinely violated the sovereignty of other countries by 
launching missile strikes on their territory in the context of fighting 
terrorism; refuses to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and opposes the 2008 
Convention on Cluster Bombs; and exempts its own military from the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The Bush administration 
has been particularly egregious in this regard, not only with its preventive 
 war doctrine, but also with its torture policy, its extraordinary renditions, 
and its indefinite detention of terrorist suspects.  
It is obvious that these global security costs create an environment that 
is threatening to Americans abroad, but, as recent critics of American 
hegemony have noted, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have shown that the 
United States is not immune from what it sows abroad. And since the 
American public did not recognize 9/11 as a “blowback” (Johnson 2006, 
2-5) related to U.S. military hegemony, it embraced the response of a 
stepped-up U.S. military hegemony and even accepted restrictions on its 
own civil liberties in the “global war on terrorism.”  
We may see the huge public protests outside the United States in 
response to American plans of war against Iraq in early 2003—February 
15, 2003, a day to remember, when as many as ten million protestors filled 
the streets—as a sign that the global community increasingly questions the 
moral legitimacy of the American hegemonic project. The pervasiveness 
of the myths that U.S. military hegemony serves humanity and protects the 
American people from the enemies of freedom and democracy helps to 
explain why Americans themselves protested in much smaller (though not 
insignificant ) numbers against the second Iraqi war. Yet, does it mean that 
the growing opposition in recent years of the American public to the 
disastrous occupation of Iraq signifies the beginning of the end of U.S. 
military hegemony and its supportive myths?  
This is to be doubted because the public opposition is much less rooted 
in a concern with the harms done to the Iraqi population and the 
immorality of forcible regime change than based on a concern that the war 
has brought few benefits to America and has cost it a great deal 
economically and in terms of American military casualties. Many citizens 
seem to prefer that the whole issue of Iraq simply would disappear. It is 
also questionable that the public opposition signifies the emergence of a 
widespread pragmatic recognition that the project of U.S. military 
hegemony has a variety of global security costs that undermine the notion 
that this hegemony brings security and stability to international relations 
and the American people. After all, too many Americans still continue to 
believe that those political leaders who are most in favor of a strong and 
aggressive U.S. military posture in the world are the best at keeping 
America safe.  
The election of Barack Obama as the new president of the United 
States does not invalidate this last point in as much as he was more 
favored by the voters for economic reasons than out of security concerns. 
At any rate, it is doubtful that his administration will fundamentally move 
away from seeking to maintain U.S. military hegemony. To be sure, we 
 
 
 
may assume that the Obama administration will seek to fulfill its promise 
of ending large-scale American military presence in Iraq, but whether it 
will accept complete withdrawal and a dismantling of all its bases in Iraq 
is at least an open question. At the same time, the Obama administration is 
aiming at a greater military presence in Afghanistan and its proposal to 
withdraw from Iraq is at least partly motivated by making this 
development feasible in the long run. More importantly, Obama argued 
even before he became president in support of U.S. military hegemony. In 
The Audacity of Hope (2006), Obama writes that “there will be times when 
we must…play the role of the world’s reluctant sheriff,” adding that “this 
will not change—nor should it” (306). He further states that the defense 
budget in the coming years might need to be raised after the conclusion of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan “in order to restore readiness and replace 
equipment” (Obama 2006, 307). The size of the military should also be 
significantly raised, partly to end the overburdening of the current troops 
and eliminate the policy of “stop loss” or involuntary extensions of the 
enlistment contracts (Shane III 2008; Obama for America 2008, 117-18, 
125-26), but more broadly because it is necessary for effectively meeting 
future asymmetrical threats that require “putting boots on the ground in the 
ungoverned or hostile regions where terrorists thrive” (Obama 2006, 
307).9
In short, it is to be expected that the Obama administration will 
continue the military hegemonic orientation of American foreign affairs 
since the Second World War. Still, there already is, and will continue to be, 
a break with the immediate past. The Obama administration has rejected in 
varying degrees some of the most striking and visible abuses of the Bush 
administration in its global war on terrorism, such as its torture, 
extraordinary rendition, and indefinite detention policies. We may also 
expect that the Obama administration will adhere to his preference for 
diplomacy and for seeking more international consensus, and especially 
the support of traditional American allies, in resort-to-force decisions 
(Obama 2006, 309). This is welcome progress, but it is a far cry from 
recognizing the fundamental immorality of the American military 
hegemonic project and seeking to replace it by a more humane military 
posture in which the United States becomes an equal and cooperative 
citizen of a peaceful international order.  
  
Questioning and Revising Just War Theory 
Critics of U.S. military hegemony, such as Noam Chomsky (2002, 
198-207; 2006, 55) often are also critics of Just War Theory. This is not 
 surprising in light of the fact that even though it would be misguided to 
view JWT as a mere ideology in support of U.S. military hegemony, it 
must also be said that many JW theorists on a regular basis have justified 
questionable American wars. This can be partly explained by the fact that 
there are different versions of JWT, some of which are more pacifistic than 
others, and that its jus ad bellum (justice in the resort to war) principles are 
somewhat underdetermined so that there is room for ideological distortion.  
However, what is also at stake is that JW theorists generally have 
looked anew at each potential military intervention by the United States 
and assessed it on its own merits rather than seeing it in a broader context 
as an aspect of the American project of military hegemony. A credible and 
critical JWT must make the very fact that we live in a unipolar military 
world part of the application of jus ad bellum principles whenever the 
issue is one of deciding whether the United States may rightfully resort to 
force.  
To illustrate how taking into account military hegemony should impact 
the application of jus ad bellum principles, consider how it affects the 
application of the principle of proportionality to U.S. resort-to-force 
decisions.10
The Gulf War presents an important case in point. The UN Security 
Council concluded that Iraq’s take-over of Kuwait was an act of 
aggression and the United States became the main military force executing 
this authorization to war. Even though JW theorists raised some questions 
about last resort and worried about high casualty numbers, ecological 
harms, and economic recession, they typically saw the war as legitimate 
(e.g., Coates 2000, Hartle 2002). What they did not pay attention to were 
the global security costs of the resort to force by the United States as 
military hegemon. The total devastation of the Iraqi army, the ability of the 
United States to bomb Iraqi cities virtually at will, and the low number of 
American casualties showed to the world that something other than 
conventional force, such as nuclear weapons or asymmetric warfare, is 
needed to deter or fight American military force. The permanent American 
military presence in the heart of the Islamic world also contributed to the 
rise of Islamic terrorism.  
 The general logic is that any successful military intervention 
by the United States typically will strengthen its position as military 
hegemon, and thus will escalate its negative consequences, such as adding 
to the global security costs inherent to U.S. military hegemony (outlined in 
the previous section) and therefore increasing the likelihood that the 
intervention will violate the proportionality principle in the first place (i.e., 
the harms resulting from the use of force will significantly outweigh its 
anticipated benefits).  
 
 
 
Moreover, the authorization of the Gulf War by the United Nations 
appears to have been a factor in this international body not gaining more 
influence and success in the post-Cold War world: The Gulf War 
emboldened U.S. hegemonic ambitions and greatly increased the 
preparedness of the American people to support their political leadership 
in opting unilaterally for war. The “Vietnam syndrome” was left behind 
and the public regained full pride and trust in the military. The success of 
the Gulf War also led to the view that America could win without massive 
troop deployment. Indeed, Ullman and Wade (1996, 30) assert 
counterfactually that “Rapid Dominance” through “Shock and Awe” might 
have resulted in success in the Gulf War “in a matter of days (or perhaps 
hours) and not after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required 
in 1990 and 1991.” In short, it seems that America’s role in the Gulf War 
enabled the second Iraq war.  
The global security costs of the use of unchecked U.S. military force in 
the Gulf War, then, at least support the case that the United States should 
have played a much less central role in the execution and planning of this 
war. Or, the case could be made that the hegemonic superpower should not 
at all have been part of the coalition force, using the U.N. mandate, even if 
this would have meant that Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait could only have 
been pursued through a much more limited military engagement, 
sanctions, negotiations, and compromise. Admittedly, these are arguments 
in hindsight, but the lesson can and should be applied to the future. 
Some other jus ad bellum principles, such as the principles of 
legitimate authority, last resort, and reasonable chance of success, might 
similarly raise the bar on justified resort to U.S. military force once their 
application takes into account the project of U.S. military hegemony (Van 
der Linden 2007a, 68-69). Considering the project of U.S. military 
hegemony in the application of jus ad bellum principles, however, is not 
enough, since this still leaves JWT only questioning U.S. military 
hegemony when war decisions are at stake, and, even so, in a limited 
fashion. In the words of antiwar feminists Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick 
(2004, 407), the problem is that “just war theorists tend to abstract 
particular wars from the war system on which they rely and which they 
strengthen.” This “war system” involves: 
arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the resources 
these preparations require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as 
morally legitimate, even alluring; and shaping and fostering the 
masculinities and femininities that undergird men’s and women’s 
acquiescence to war” (Cohn and Ruddick 2004, 406).  
 Just Military Preparedness Principles 
What is needed, then, to further improve JWT is that it articulates 
principles for assessing the hegemonic war system. I will articulate below 
five principles of “just military preparedness,” which may be viewed as a 
new addition to JWT addressing the justice of preparing for the possibility 
of going to war (jus potentia ad bellum).11
A. The First Principle: Force for Basic Human  
Rights Protection Only  
 The five principles challenge 
the moral legitimacy of the United States seeking military hegemony and 
offer a more humane vision of how to meet security threats that would 
bring us closer to a lasting peaceful international order. In this regard, the 
principles have a status similar to Immanuel Kant’s preliminary articles of 
perpetual peace, especially the articles that cover what is to be done when 
nations are not at war. I will conclude this essay with some brief comments 
on the connection between jus potentia ad bellum and the three other 
categories of JWT, jus ad bellum (justice in the resort to war), jus in bello 
(justice in the execution of war), and jus post bellum (justice in the ending 
of war).  
This principle is that military preparedness must fit with its general 
purpose of protecting human beings from basic human rights violations on 
a large scale (cf. Luban 1980). With one important qualification, this 
purpose fits with the traditional understanding that states have a right to 
defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity against acts of aggression 
by other countries (national self-defense) and that states may assist other 
nations under unjust attacks (law enforcement). The qualification is that 
states that fail to protect their own citizens from widespread violations of 
their basic rights or attack their own citizens in genocidal ways have no 
just cause against other states seeking to protect the threatened citizens 
(humanitarian intervention). Only national self-defense as a specific goal 
of military preparation warrants unilateral military action (at least in the 
initial stage of self-defense), while the specific goals of law enforcement 
and humanitarian intervention should be pursued through collective 
authorization and military action. One reason in support of collective 
control and execution of military force is that war impacts all nations by 
threatening the international order of states. Another reason is that 
individual national communities tend to have distorted perspectives due to 
considerations of national interests. An international deliberative body is 
necessary to prevent an abuse of power and to reach more objective 
 
 
 
decisions concerning matters of global law enforcement and basic human 
rights protection, and the execution of military force for these goals is best 
carried out by a true coalition of multinational forces because great 
dominance by one force will undermine collective authorization in the 
long run. We may see the United Nations as based on this insight even 
though the veto system of the Security Council reflects a bow to the 
politics of power and national interests of the time.  
None of the three goals of just military preparedness requires the 
United States to have military forces that seek to project power across the 
globe. Only a small American military force is needed to protect the 
United States itself from acts of aggression. The notion of a foreign nation 
attacking the United States is farfetched, while terrorism in general is not a 
real military problem but rather a criminal problem requiring, foremost, a 
police response, international crime cooperation, obstructing the financial 
sources of terrorism, securing of WMD materials, and the like (Cortright 
and Lopez 2007). In the long run, the elimination of terrorist threats also 
requires the elimination of social conditions favorable to terrorism (see, 
further, the third principle of just military preparedness).  
Granted, states sponsoring terrorism may constitute a threat to 
international security, but this falls under the law enforcement goal of just 
military preparedness. Similarly, American involvement in collective 
humanitarian rescue efforts would require only a limited U.S. military 
force. Even on the implausible assumption that in a given instance the 
world community except for the United States would fail to display a 
humanitarian conscience and the United States would have to be the 
central or sole force of some intervention, a U.S. military far smaller and 
differently composed than the current one would suffice. What is typically 
required in an intervention is the use of ground forces protecting 
threatened population groups—and note that this fact alone makes the use 
of multinational forces preferable in that it involves a fair distribution of 
sacrifice—rather than high-tech warfare. Indeed, it is the focus on high-
tech warfare that might have played a role in the tragic failure of the 
United States to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. In an op-ed piece 
defending the Kosovo intervention, and apparently responding to the 
charge of selectivity, Samuel Berger, the National Security Adviser of the 
Clinton administration, wrote: “We certainly couldn’t have acted in 
Rwanda militarily. It is difficult to stop people going after each other with 
machetes with an F-16.”12
With regard to the task of enforcing international security, if the United 
Nations would function fully effectively as an organization charged with 
maintaining the peace and authorizing force as a last resort, then, again, 
  
 the United States would need only a rather limited military force. Its role 
would be to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions and to participate in 
multinational forces aimed at countering blatant acts of aggression. Power 
politics, narrow national interests, and the veto system of the Security 
Council, among other factors, have, however, obstructed the effective 
functioning of the United Nations. In transition toward better collective 
security arrangements and institutions, American military preparedness 
needs to be temporarily somewhat more extensive, allowing in exceptional 
circumstances for the possibility of the use of military force—in support of 
other nations subjected to acts of aggression—that is not fully collectively 
authorized and executed. But such temporary “concession” does not mean 
approval of unilateralism or that anything like the current U.S. military 
presence across the globe is needed.  
A first step that the United States should take with regard to 
maintaining a peaceful international order is to cease to be part of the 
problem by ending its global power projection. The United States should 
immediately end its imperial project and division of the world into spheres 
under its command (USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, etc.) and begin to 
dismantle its “empire of bases” (Johnson 2004), opting for rapid 
withdrawal in some cases and a more gradual exit in others. Most nations 
can take care of their own security needs and regional security alliances 
can provide additional protection.  
A second step is that the United States should change its present 
political culture of devaluing and even mocking the United Nations and 
work instead toward improving the organization by supporting, for 
example, endeavors to make the Security Council more representative of 
the global community and to eliminate the veto system.  
Finally, the United States should not only greatly reduce the quantity of 
its military hardware, but should also steer away from weapon systems 
with hegemonic designs or other aims in conflict with the purpose of just 
military preparedness.  
The argument for arms reduction is the easiest to make because it is 
clear that the current high number of American aircraft carriers and attack 
submarines (among other weapon systems) are needed only for 
maintaining military hegemony. Furthermore, some weapons have such an 
indiscriminate nature, either immediately when used or in their long-term 
impact, that they are antithetical to the protection of citizens as the overall 
purpose of just military preparedness. Clear examples of such weapons are 
landmines, cluster munitions, depleted uranium weapons, and nuclear 
weapons. It is more difficult to articulate what kind of weapons would be 
excluded if the United States were to adopt a truly defensive rather than 
 
 
 
global dominance posture. Presumably, it would exclude, for example, the 
increased use and development of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with 
attack purposes. At any rate, two weapon systems stand out overall as most 
in violation of just military preparedness: nuclear weapons and weapons in 
space.  
The United States currently has a nuclear stockpile of around 5,400 
warheads, a number that is expected to decrease only modestly in the years 
ahead (Norris and Kristensen 2008, 50). This number in some sense shows 
progress as compared to the 30,000 or so warheads in the possession of the 
United States at the height of the Cold War, but it is a number that boggles 
the rational mind (a much smaller figure suffices for nuclear omnicide). 
Recently, former Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, 
together with former Defense Secretary William Perry and former 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, have 
called for a world free of nuclear weapons, first in a widely published 
statement in 2007 (Schultz et al. 2007) and then again in 2008 (Schultz et 
al. 2008). They suggest in their statements that nuclear weapons are 
inhumane, irrational, and a threat to collective security and human 
survival. But, more specifically, their call for a nuclear-free world is 
motivated by the fear that terrorist groups might acquire nuclear weapons 
and that nuclear proliferation will increase the risk of accidents and 
unauthorized or misjudged nuclear launches as well as force the United 
States “to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, 
psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was 
Cold War deterrence” (Schulz et al. 2007, par. 4). They further propose a 
variety of intermediate steps toward a nuclear-free world, appealing 
especially to the United States and Russia as the possessors of almost 95% 
of the world’s nuclear warheads to initiate these steps (Schulz et al. 2008, 
par. 8). The steps include ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT); accelerating the securing of nuclear materials across the world; 
creating launching procedures of nuclear weapons that reduce the risk of 
hasty decisions and accidental and unauthorized uses; and, eliminating all 
“forward deployment” short-range nuclear weapons.  
Schultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn make in synoptic fashion a strong 
case for the abolition of nuclear weapons and offer valuable proposals 
toward its implementation. What is lacking in their statement, though, is 
the realization that what they see as a serious setback for the United 
States—having to deal with a much greater number of nuclear powers in 
the world—might be perceived as a gain by countries opposed to U.S. 
military hegemony. In other words, what they fail to see (or acknowledge) 
is that U.S. military hegemony is a cause of nuclear proliferation and that 
 ending this hegemony might be a necessary condition for halting this 
proliferation in its tracks. Skeptics may even see their plea for the 
abolition of nuclear weapons as an attempt to prevent that the spread of 
nuclear weapons among some countries in the South will restrain U.S. 
military hegemony.13 At any rate, what must be added to their proposals of 
how to move toward a nuclear-free world are proposals concerning how to 
end U.S. military hegemony.14
The weaponization of space is deeply irrational in the same manner as 
the build-up of nuclear weapons by the United States after Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was irrational, leading to the nuclear arms race with the Soviet 
Union and the danger of nuclear omnicide. One nation’s possession of 
space weapons will inevitably lead others to acquire them, setting the stage 
for war in space. This scenario is deeply irrational because, as Theresa 
Hitchens (2007, 2) of the Center for Defense Information puts it, “the 
specter of warfare in space—especially warfare involving destructive anti-
satellite weapons that would produce tons of dangerous and indiscriminate 
space debris—would endanger all space operations, civil, commercial and 
military.” She adds: “As the world’s preeminent space power, the United 
States would have the most to lose in a world bristling with space 
armaments and thus it is in U.S. national interests that space not be 
weaponized.” Besides, the weaponizing of space would be a huge expense 
and have great opportunity costs (and so violate the third and fourth 
principles of just military preparedness). 
 
Yet, for a decade now the United States has consistently blocked 
widely supported efforts in the United Nations to negotiate a Prevention of 
an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty. For an even longer time the 
United States has issued military policy documents proclaiming that 
military domination of space, involving both anti-satellite weapons located 
in space and on earth as well as weapons in space directed against 
terrestrial targets, is needed to maintain its dominance of air, land, and sea 
(Hitchens 2007, 2-13 and 17-18; Grossman 2001). Thus hegemonic 
ambitions together with the apparent belief that somehow other countries 
will not challenge the United States as “space cop” might set in motion a 
disastrous course of events.  
 The signs of a possible arms race in space are on the wall. In 2007, the 
Chinese successfully used an anti-satellite missile to destroy one of their 
own satellites, while the United States did the same in February 2008. And 
even though Congress is divided about the matter, the United States 
continues to spend hundreds of millions of dollars for research directly 
supportive of space weapons, while much larger sums are allocated to 
programs that are at least indirectly supportive of this goal (Hitchens and 
 
 
 
Samson, 2008; Kaufman et al. 2008). What adds to the risk of a space 
arms race is that there is a lack of transparency. A significant part of 
military space spending (which includes military satellites, and the like) is 
classified, and similar uncertainty concerning aims and purposes exists 
with regard to the expanded military space programs of such countries as 
China and India (Guiney 2008; Kaufman et al. 2008). Ultimately, it seems 
that the only secure way to prevent an arms race in space is to end U.S. 
military hegemony.  
B. The Second Principle: Towards a Morally Competent Military  
This principle is that military personnel should receive training and 
education fitting to the basic purpose of just military preparedness and 
should participate fully in moral decisions concerning the initiation and 
execution of military force as well as in political life in general. The U.S. 
military clearly fails to satisfy this principle. Part of the problem is that 
training and education for hegemonic use of force leaves the military 
without the appropriate skills for such tasks as peacekeeping and 
humanitarian intervention. An even more serious problem is that U.S. 
military personnel are not adequately morally reflective concerning their 
military actions. Timothy L. Challans, who has broad experience teaching 
at U.S. military academic institutions, writes:  
The vast majority of military students I have personally taught in the 
classroom have many malformed moral beliefs. For example, most justify 
the exorbitant degree of collateral damage. They also justify harsh and 
coercive interrogation measures, even after understanding the manifestly 
illegal nature of such actions. They are more than willing to err on the side 
of excessive force or unnecessary harm over finding a balance between due 
risk and due care. [They display] contempt for the United Nations or any 
other international institution [and have] dismissive attitudes toward 
customary and international law that would impede the application of their 
unmatched power (Callans 2007, 24). 
Challans adds that it is the “military realism” and “political realism” of 
his students that lead them to have these immoral convictions. In other 
words, the students fail to engage in genuine moral reflection and embrace 
instead without much thought U.S. military hegemony and whatever is 
required to sustain it and lead it to victory. Apparently, the students are less 
concerned than their military and political leaders to couch the use of 
American force in uplifting moral terms (no doubt, often meant only for 
public purposes).  
 Challans maintains that current moral education in the military fails to 
improve the level of moral thinking of soldiers because this education 
tends to be authoritarian, instrumentalist, rooted in unreflective religious 
faith, and based on ideological stereotypes and mere military narratives. 
His solution is to infuse the moral education of the military with 
philosophical ethics, especially in the tradition of Kant and Rawls. On his 
account, the ethics centers at the three major military academies in 
cooperation with philosophy departments elsewhere could play a pivotal 
role in promoting this education across the Army, the Navy, and the Air 
Force (Callans 2007, 184). Challans also hints at the need for related 
institutional changes, arguing that we need “legitimate avenues of public 
reason and disagreement, dissent, and disobedience within the war 
machine.” That is, “we need a healthier culture so that people know when 
and where they can speak out, disobey, walk away, or even resign in 
protest.” And this is of the greatest urgency because “the price of failure 
now can be in the trillions of dollars and millions of lives” (Callans 2007, 
186). Obviously this urgent task is incompatible with the hegemony-
oriented military. 
The second principle of just military preparedness pushes this proposal 
further in that it requires the military to become a participatory and open 
institution with reflective moral agents. The common vision of soldiers as 
mere instruments of the state who need not concern themselves with jus ad 
bellum issues should be replaced by a view of soldiers as morally 
responsible agents with rights. Lack of dissent and moral reflection, denial 
of input from below in institutional decision-making, and gender and 
sexual-orientation discrimination—as reflected in the exclusion of women 
from direct combat roles and the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy—
should not be tolerated or imposed in the name of “fighting efficiency” (cf. 
Solaro 2006). The dignity and moral autonomy of soldiers alone require 
the U.S. military to improve in these areas, but the case for change can 
also be made on basis of the benefits that this change would bring to 
society, the soldiers themselves, and the military itself. To name some 
benefits, the emergence of morally competent soldiers addressing war-
decision issues will reduce the chance of premature or wrong resort to 
military force. It will also largely avoid the common cost of soldiers 
finding themselves with moral doubt and guilt about their participation in 
an unjust war; after all, it is typical that sooner or later their veil of 
ignorance concerning fighting in an unjust war is torn away.  
In the United States, broader involvement by military personnel in 
political and moral issues related to their profession has become especially 
urgent with the change from a conscription military force to the volunteer 
 
 
 
professional army in that this change has meant that the population at large 
has become less directly concerned with American military interventions. 
A more vocal and politically involved military might, for example, have 
constrained the civilian military hawks in the Bush administration in their 
rush to war with Iraq (cf. Bacevitch 2005, 63-64). The military itself might 
also gain from increased moral competency and public debate within its 
ranks because the likelihood would be reduced of the military finding 
itself involved in an unjust protracted war with demoralized soldiers, 
undermining its long term capacity of effectively serving the overall 
purpose of just military preparedness. Moreover, a more diverse and 
morally competent military will better perform tasks where police and 
traditional military work intersect, such as peacekeeping and providing 
security for nation-building.  
It might be objected that increased moral competency among soldiers 
is generally undesirable because it might lead soldiers to refuse to fight not 
only in unjust wars but also in just wars. It must be granted, I think, that 
such moral misjudgments might occur and so we might end up with 
having to recognize in some cases a misplaced refusal to fight. This seems 
a small price to pay. It also seems a price that should be paid in the first 
place because it is almost as morally repugnant in a modern democracy to 
train soldiers to kill without moral reflection on the justice of their cause 
as to force them to kill against their conscience. 
The United States has a record of training many soldiers from foreign 
countries, including soldiers from countries with oppressive regimes who 
end up contributing to gross human rights violations. Just military 
preparedness would end this tainted record. The adoption of the first 
principle of just military preparedness would imply a severe reduction of 
the training programs for foreign soldiers, while the fulfillment of the 
second principle would mean that the foreign soldiers would be so trained 
that they end up contributing to just military preparedness of their own 
countries. 
 
C. The Third Principle: Prioritizing Nonviolent Ways 
of Preventing Threats and Solving Conflicts 
This principle requires that priority is given to nonmilitary means of 
realizing the basic purpose of military preparedness. The human costs of 
resort to military force are immense and significantly unpredictable. 
Priority should therefore be given to the measures that prevent the need to 
resort to military force through the elimination of contributing factors to 
wars of aggression and through finding nonviolent ways of solving 
 conflict. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, soldiers might be able to use 
at times nonviolent measures of diffusing threats, but the requirement of 
proper training in this regard falls under the second principle of military 
preparedness. Following the third principle, all countries should make it 
their main concern to support the United Nations in its numerous 
nonmilitary programs and tasks that contribute to international security 
and stability, including adjudication of emerging conflicts, promotion of 
human rights, environmental protection, arms control, peace education, 
and refugee assistance. NGOs with similar aims should also be supported, 
while high-income countries should make concerted efforts to reduce 
desperate global poverty and economic inequality as contributing factors 
of violent conflict. All these measures will also reduce terrorism, and so 
the need for military counter-terrorism (to the limited extent that it might 
be justified) would be reduced, as well.  
It is difficult to quantify the exact proper proportion of military versus 
nonmilitary spending in support of security and protection, but this should 
not prevent us from noting that the current proportion is out of balance, 
both globally and in the United States. Perhaps most striking is that the 
American per capita contribution to the U.N. budget is less than two 
dollars per year, while the contribution per capita to the defense budget is 
at least two thousand dollars per year. These contributions appear partly so 
disproportionate due to the huge military budget of the United States, but 
there is also a clear worldwide misbalance in that the U. N. nonmilitary 
budget is only about one percent of global military expenditures. 
 Two other figures illustrate that the United States violates the third 
principle of just military preparedness and hence should reduce its military 
spending and greatly increase its spending on nonmilitary security and 
protection measures. The American ratio of military spending to official 
development aid in recent years has been around 25 to 1, in sharp contrast 
to the lowest ratio of 2 to 1 to be found in, among other countries, Holland, 
Belgium, and Denmark. Almost all donor nations are much closer to the 
lowest ratio than to the top ratio of the United States (cf. Sachs 2005, 330). 
The National Priorities Project (NPP) offers a somewhat overlapping 
illustration of the misbalance of U.S. national security spending. 
Distinguishing three strategies of providing national security—the military, 
homeland security, and “preventive measures” such as economic aid and 
“securing nuclear materials abroad and participating in multi-lateral 
diplomatic and peacekeeping operations”—the NPP notes that federal 
spending in the fiscal year 2005 on security in the United States was 
heavily geared toward the military (89%), while 7% was spent on 
homeland security and 4% on preventive measures (NPP n.d.).15  
 
 
 
D. The Fourth Principle: Balancing Security  
against Other Values 
This jus potentia ad bellum principle is that governments must 
carefully balance the value of security promoted by military preparedness 
against other values they must advance, ranging from health to education 
and culture. Hegemonic military spending in the United States violates this 
principle at the outset in that the global security costs of U.S. military 
hegemony reduce in the long run the safety of its citizens. But abstracting 
from this point, it is clear that the United States violates the principle in 
light of the very significant opportunity costs of its current levels of 
military spending, especially to vulnerable groups in society. A mere 30% 
cut in its military spending would, for example, provide adequate health 
care to all uninsured (at least 40 million people), or another 10% cut would 
pay for 10 million tuition scholarships to public universities or for more 
than one million extra teachers, say in music, art, and elementary education 
(cf. NPP n.d.).  
And, of course, the issue is not merely a monetary one. Considerable 
human resources are invested in the military as well as in the research and 
development of weapons. Imagine the impact of 40% of the military’s 
human resources invested in improving depressed communities. Or 
consider the impact of the human ingenuity now invested in research and 
development (R&D) for the military focused instead on promoting 
alternative energy sources. We can get a sense of this impact by noting that 
the Department of Defense (DOD), with over $80 billion in R&D in 2009, 
accounts for more than half of all federal R&D support (Koizumi 2008, 
63). Much of this goes to industries for weapons development, but DOD 
also plays an important role in supporting basic and applied research, 
especially in some fields. A recent study notes that DOD “supports 31 
percent of all federal [funded] research in the computer sciences and a 
similar proportion of all engineering research, as well as 29 percent of 
federal oceanography research and 14 percent of mathematics. DOD's 
impact is even greater in several engineering sub-disciplines such as 
electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and materials” (Koizumi 
2008, 63). 
Environmental protection contributes to such human values as health 
and culture; arguably, it is also valuable for the sake of nature itself. War 
generally has a serious negative impact on the environment, leaving 
behind a trail of toxic waste created by spent weapons and destroyed 
industries; air and water pollution; land degradation and unexploded 
ordnance; countless killed animals; and deforestation. Accordingly, the 
 environmental impact of war should play a significant role in both the 
decision to go war and how to execute war, but it is in fact an issue much 
neglected or underplayed by JW theorists, environmental ethicists, and the 
military itself (Woods 2007, 19, 23-27). The defoliation programs of the 
United States during the Vietnam War led in the 1970s to the creation of 
some treaties that make it a war crime to engage deliberately in severe 
environmental destruction or use the environment as a weapon of war, but 
the treaties have never been used for their intended purpose (Woods 2007, 
22). It is even more urgent for the sake of safeguarding the environment 
that the value of military preparedness be balanced against the value of 
environmental protection.  
The greatest military environmental damage and destruction happen 
during training exercises, the production of weapons—and here radioactive 
waste is a great concern—and the testing of weapons (cf. Woods 2007, 29-
30). The Pentagon does not seem to follow this guideline. For example, 
without offering much supportive data, the Pentagon continues to seek 
more exemptions to environmental laws for its training exercises than it 
was already granted during President Bush’s first term (U.S. GAO 2008). 
The Pentagon also fails to take responsibility for the fact that its expanding 
empire of bases is an empire of severely polluted lands. As Chalmers 
Johnson (2006, 149) notes, the United States typically seeks agreements 
with host countries which “exempt the United States from cleaning up or 
paying for the environmental damage it causes.” More broadly, for the 
sake of environmental protection alone, it is necessary that the U.S. 
military severely limits its production, development, and testing of 
weapons as well as its large-scale training exercises, artillery practices, 
etc., whereby then some of the freed financial resources could be used to 
clean up the more than twenty thousand polluted DOD sites in the United 
States. 
 
E. The Fifth Principle: Legitimate Authority and Right Intention 
The final principle of “just military preparedness” is that there should 
be a “right or legitimate authority” for settling military preparedness 
policies, and this authority should be guided by the “right intention” of 
seeking military readiness for the overall purpose of protecting citizens. In 
a democracy, the people and their representatives should subject the scope 
and specific goals of military preparedness to collective control and public 
debate.  
Again, the United States violates this principle. The American defense 
budget is not transparent, even to members of Congress; mismanagement, 
fraud, and waste are common; and the choices of politicians concerning 
 
 
 
the development and purchase of military hardware are highly influenced 
by lobbyists, the financial interests of weapons manufacturers, and the aim 
of maintaining employment opportunities in their home states. For the 
weapons manufacturers, the continuation of the status quo is indeed very 
attractive: they are guaranteed a very large local market with high profit 
margins, while their R&D costs are heavily subsidized by DOD (Lutz 
forthcoming). The American government further strengthens the global 
competitiveness of American weapons manufacturers by way of its 
military assistance programs to allied countries, making it not surprising 
that the United States is by far the largest arms dealer in the world.  
Accordingly, legitimate authority with right intention in just military 
preparedness requires the elimination of the “military-industrial complex.” 
It also requires that politicians set aside the myth of America’s unique 
goodness and greatness on the world stage and cease their incessant praise 
of the heroes who fight and sacrifice for democracy and freedom. Instead, 
politicians with legitimate just military preparedness authority would tell a 
story of a nation that is an equal citizen of the community of nations and 
has heroes of great restraint in the use of force. 
Just Military Preparedness and Its Impact  
on Other Just War Theory Categories 
The basic connection between “just military preparedness” and the 
three other JWT categories—“jus ad bellum,” “jus in bello,” and “jus post 
bellum”—is that once the institutions and cultural practices that must 
enable the execution of just wars are flawed in terms of just military 
preparedness, there is bound to be a reduced justice (or increased injustice) 
in the actual resort to force, the manner of the execution of military force, 
and in the ending of war. I will briefly illustrate this general point on basis 
of how American hegemonic military preparedness is bound to impact the 
other three JWT categories, beginning with jus ad bellum.  
The discussion in the section “Questioning and Revising Just War 
Theory,” above, suggests how the principle of proportionality is affected. 
Since the U.S. hegemonic military preparedness aims to project power 
across the globe (and even into space) with its huge expenditures, large 
professional army, offensive weaponry, and military presence in dozens of 
countries, any U.S. intervention—even if there is a just cause and a fairly 
limited scale of resort to force—will increase the global security costs 
connected to the U.S. military hegemonic project. Accordingly, hegemonic 
military preparedness makes it more difficult for the United States to 
satisfy the proportionality principle. Similarly, unilateral interventions 
 (except in the case of reactive self-defense) always violate the principle of 
legitimate authority, but hegemonic military preparedness further adds to 
the wrongness of unilateralism.  
Since hegemonic wars are more disruptive of the international order 
than non-hegemonic wars (others things being equal), there should be a 
greater concern in the application of the principle of legitimate authority 
when the United States is considering resort to force than is true of other 
countries. Moreover, since the United States projects itself as “global cop” 
and unsupervised cops might turn into rogue cops abusing power, the logic 
of this projection is that the global community should be the supervisor. It 
should be further noted that the lack of transparency and democratic wills-
formation regarding military preparedness issues in the United States spills 
over into its resort-to-force decisions. Limited military force is often used 
against other nations without any democratic oversight, and even in the 
case of full-scale military conflict Congress has not taken seriously its 
responsibility as the institution that should declare war. In addition, the 
military-industrial complex that pushes for the acquisition of hegemonic 
military hardware and so weakens legitimate authority in just military 
preparedness also weakens jus ad bellum legitimate authority. The reason 
is that the military-industrial complex favors war as an instrument of 
solving political conflict because it is profitable, since war, unlike 
nonmilitary conflict resolution, legitimates the replacement of this 
hardware and its continuous development.  
This reason also illustrates that lack of justice in military preparedness 
is bound to weaken the claim that a given resort to force decision has 
satisfied the last resort principle, while the principle of right intention is 
similarly put in question. But the problem goes beyond the distorting 
impact of war profiteering. Once a country fails to invest adequate 
resources in war prevention and nonviolent conflict resolution strategies 
and instead places all or most of its resources under the rubric of military 
conflict preparation, any claim that a war was a last resort has at the outset 
greatly diminished credibility. And, clearly, most wars of recent memory 
must be censured from this angle. 
With regard to the link between just military preparedness and jus in 
bello, we have noted that the United States continues to have a variety of 
weapons in its arsenal, such as cluster bombs, landmines, and depleted 
uranium weapons, the very use of which violates the jus in bello principle 
of discrimination or noncombatant immunity, at least on the fairly strict 
interpretation of this principle that requires that “due care” is taken to 
avoid civilian casualties (Walzer 1977, 155-56). Moreover, high-tech 
hegemonic weapons are bound to often make the execution of war 
 
 
 
indiscriminate and in violation of the jus in bello principle of proportionality, 
especially when war is waged against insurgents in civilian settings. 
Lastly, military training in a culture that celebrates hegemonic warfare is, 
to say the least, not an antidote to the commitment of war crimes. War and 
atrocity are deeply linked, a fact that constitutes a strong indictment of—
and challenge to—resort to force, but moral competency and critical-
reflective moral education are barriers to atrocity. So just military 
preparedness might not completely sever the link between war and 
atrocity, but (unlike hegemonic military preparedness) it would at least 
drive a wedge between the two.  
The victor in a military conflict typically sets the terms of the peace 
settlement. Following Brian Orend, who has in recent years proposed the 
new JWT category of jus post bellum (2000 and 2006), a just peace 
requires a public and measured peace settlement; the restoration to long-
term security of the basic rights violated by the aggressor; punishment of 
the initiators of the war of aggression; punishment of soldiers on both 
sides who have committed war crimes; compensation; and rehabilitation of 
the aggressor nation, including the transformation of its political and 
military institutions so that the aggressor nation becomes a good global 
citizen of the community of nations (Orend 2006, 180-81).  
Even when the United States is a righteous victor, reasonable doubts 
may be raised about its ability and credibility to establish a just peace 
along these lines. Temporary military bases might be justified to supervise 
a transition toward a rehabilitated society. However, the United States has 
a historical record of establishing permanent military bases in foreign 
countries, often against the popular will and serving its hegemonic military 
interests (Lutz 2009). It also imposes its own vision of the good society, 
including privatizing state enterprises and services and opening up local 
markets to its corporations, while pushing its military hardware to newly 
installed regimes. America’s efforts to exempt its military from any 
prosecution outside its own jurisdiction will increasingly raise questions 
about its capacity to justly punish enemy soldiers (or insurgents).  
Add to this that American interventions have been frequent since it 
strived to become a hegemonic military force in 1945 and often have been 
morally questionable or clear acts of aggression—and, of course, 
aggressor victors cannot bring about a just peace—and we must conclude 
that the United States has thoroughly undermined its credibility as a nation 
that is able to impose rehabilitation measures on other nations. Instead, it 
is high time that the United States engages in self-rehabilitation, and 
moves toward just military preparedness as a step toward lasting just 
peace. 
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Notes 
                                                   
1 Most historians currently accept that the atomic bomb was dropped with the aims 
of intimidating Russia and curtailing its influence in East Asia; the controversy 
concerns the centrality of these motives. See Bess 2006, 239-42.  
2 On January 24, 2003, Ullman expressed the applicability of “Shock and Awe” to 
Iraq in the followings words: “You're sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you're 
the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also 
take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2,3,4,5 
days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted” (CBS News 
2003). Thus Ullman even suggests that an American ground war might not be 
needed at all. His proposal to destroy the water and electricity facilities of Baghdad 
violates the jus in bello principle of discrimination and so is morally to be rejected. 
It is debatable whether bombing such facilities is a (legal) war crime in that the 
facilities may be described as dual purpose targets. 
3 In the month after the bombing of Baghdad, Ullman (2003) expressed some 
doubts about whether his strategy was properly followed – and it is still a matter of 
debate among military strategists – but he confirms the appropriateness of the 
characterization in the Introduction to the Pavilion Press edition of Ullman and 
Wade (1996).  
4 See Lifton and Mitchell 1995, 4 and 170. Truman made these claims on August 6 
and 9, 1945, respectively.  
5 UNICEF estimated in 1998 that a half million children under the age of five 
alone had died as a result of the sanctions (Arnove 2000, 161). My claim here 
about the general American silence about this tragedy is not meant to deny that 
some American peace groups, unions, city councils, etc., admirably protested 
  
against this tragedy as well as this silence. For their voices, see Clark 1998. Nor do 
I seek to deny the culpability of the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein.  
6 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated in early 2008 (on basis of a 
survey of around 10,000 households) that 151,000 Iraqi civilians had died violently 
during the first three years of the occupation (Kukis 2008). Iraq Body Count offers 
an estimate of up to 98,000 civilians killed (through November 2008). See 
http://www.iraqbodycount.org.  
7 In just war theory, there is a longstanding tradition that resort to force is only 
justified in response to some wrong or harm, not in order to promote a good, such 
as “civilizing people” or “spreading democracy.” Accordingly, Francisco de 
Vitoria already protested the colonial conquest of the Americas in his time in the 
name of promoting Christianity. The principle of non-intervention of the U.N. 
Charter precludes resort to force for the sake of democracy.  
8 There are many critical discussions of unilateral preventive war, but few critics 
have addressed the morality of collective preventive war. I contest the moral 
permissibility of U.N. authorized preventive war in Van der Linden 2007b.  
9 Obama seems to echo here Recommendations 47-49 of the bipartisan The Iraq 
Study Group Report: The Way Forward – a New Approach (Baker et al. 2006). In 
my view, this study group of eminent Republicans and Democrats proposed to 
withdraw from Iraq not in order to end U.S. military hegemony but to save it from 
further threats or dissolution. Plausibly, Obama may share this motivation. The 
Report proposes in Recommendation 47: “As redeployment proceeds, the 
Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the 
forces that have returned to the continental United States in order to ‘reset’ the 
force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global 
contingencies.” For the same reason, Recommendation 48 states: “As the 
equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate funds to 
restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years.” And the 
Report calls likewise in Recommendation 49 for a budgetary adjustment aimed at 
future recruitment and personnel retention.  
10 I am partly drawing here from a more expanded discussion in Van der Linden 
2009. 
11 The term is coined in Woods 2007, 29. I suggested the need for the principles in 
Van der Linden (2007a, 69) and offer a first brief discussion of them in Van der 
Linden (2009, 44-46). 
12 See Berger 1999, 6. Of course, the main reason for American inaction was 
Rwanda’s marginal political and economic role in the world. The failure to commit 
ground troops in Kosovo was both a strategic and moral error and so the limited 
success of the Kosovo intervention cannot be taken as an argument for claiming 
that interventions require large high-tech armies. Cf. Walzer 2004, chapter 7.  
13 Wallerstein (2004) argues that American display of its military dominance 
makes nuclear proliferation inevitable and “not necessarily bad.” It is his hope that 
the more widespread possession of nuclear weapons among states (in combination 
with other failures of hegemony and unilateralism) may lead the United States to 
become a better global citizen. For a similar view, see Greider (2006). In my view, 
 
 
 
 
this estimation might be correct; yet, we should oppose hegemony and 
proliferation at the same time.  
14 President Obama has expressed his support of the Schultz proposal for a nuclear 
free world (Obama for America 2008, 131), and so may be criticized along the 
same lines.  
15 The Obama administration plans to double the spending on such preventive 
measures by 2012 (Obama for America 2008, 138). This would be a small but still 
significant step in the right direction, but the current financial crisis (among other 
factors) might prevent its realization.  
 
 
 
 
